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Abstract—Neural Network classifiers have been used success-
fully in a wide range of applications. However, their underlying
assumption of attack free environment has been defied by
adversarial examples. Researchers tried to develop defenses;
however, existing approaches are still far from providing ef-
fective solutions to this evolving problem. In this paper, we
design a generative adversarial net (GAN) based zero knowledge
adversarial training defense, dubbed ZK-GanDef, which does
not consume adversarial examples during training. Therefore,
ZK-GanDef is not only efficient in training but also adaptive
to new adversarial examples. This advantage comes at the
cost of small degradation in test accuracy compared to full
knowledge approaches. Our experiments show that ZK-GanDef
enhances test accuracy on adversarial examples by up-to 49.17%
compared to zero knowledge approaches. More importantly, its
test accuracy is close to that of the state-of-the-art full knowledge
approaches (maximum degradation of 8.46%), while taking much
less training time.
Index Terms—Adversarial Training Defense, Generative Ad-
versarial Nets, full knowledge training, zero knowledge training
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the surprisingly good representation power of com-
plex distributions, neural network (NN) classifiers are widely
used in many tasks which include natural language processing,
computer vision and cyber security. For example, in cyber
security, NN classifiers are used for spam filtering, phishing
detection as well as face recognition [21] [1]. However, the
training and usage of NN classifiers are based on an underlying
assumption that the environment is attack free. Therefore, such
classifiers fail when adversarial examples are presented to
them.
Adversarial examples were first introduced in 2013 by
Szegedy et. al [24] in the context of image classification. They
show that adding specially designed perturbations to original
images could effectively mislead fully trained NN classifier.
For example, in Figure 1, the adversarial perturbations added
to the image of panda are visually insignificant to human eyes,
but are strong enough to mislead the classifier to classify it as
gibbon. Yet, more scary, the research shows that adversary
could arbitrarily control the output class through carefully
This work is submitted to DSN 2019 as a regular paper. The official
implementation is open-source on Github. https://github.com/GuanxiongLiu/
DSN-ZK-GanDef.git
Fig. 1: Fast Gradient Sign Example [6]
designed perturbations and can achieve high success rate
against Vanilla classifiers, i.e., classifiers without defenses [4]
[9] [14].
Current defensive mechanisms against adversarial examples
can be categorized into three different groups [15] [19]. The
approaches of the first group utilize augmentation and regular-
ization to enhance test accuracy on adversarial examples. The
idea here is to improve the generalization of the model as a
defense against adversarial examples [19]. Approaches in the
second group try to build protective shells around the classifier
to either identify adversarial examples and filter them out,
or reform perturbations and rollback to original images [15]
[22]. The approaches in the last group retrain NN classifiers
with adversarial examples to recognize and correctly classify
perturbed inputs [9]. The intuition here is that by observing
some adversarial examples with their ground truth, the NN
classifiers learn the patterns of adversarial perturbations and
adapt to recognize similar ones.
Current defenses enhance test accuracy of existing NN
models on adversarial examples and help us better under-
stand the problem. However, such defenses are still far from
wining the battle against this continuously evolving problem.
Among different defenses, adversarial training with iterative
adversarial examples is shown to be the state-of-the-art choice
[2]. However, such defense requires too much computation
to generate iterative adversarial examples during training.
Based on [7], the adversarial training with iterative adversarial
examples requires a cluster of GPU servers on Imagenet
dataset. Although there are defense methods that do not rely
on adversarial training [20] [28], these methods only address
weaker attack scenarios (black-box and gray-box).
With these limitations on existing defenses, researchers
start a new line of research on zero knowledge adversarial
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training which is independent of adversarial examples. The
idea here is to replace adversarial examples with random
noise perturbations while retraining of NN classifiers [7]. The
intuition is to trade small decrease in accuracy for better
scalability, efficiency and quick adaptability. In this work,
the adversarial training approaches which utilize adversarial
examples are denoted as full knowledge adversarial training,
in contrast with zero knowledge ones.
As we show in our evaluation, existing zero knowledge
adversarial training approaches, clean logit pairing (CLP) and
clean logit squeezing (CLS) [7], suffer from poor prediction
accuracy. In this work, we propose a GAN based zero knowl-
edge adversarial training defense, dubbed ZK-GanDef. ZK-
GanDef is designed based on adversarial training approach
combined with feature learning [13] [27] [11]. It forms a com-
petition game of two NNs: a classifier and a discriminator. We
show analytically that the solution of this competition game
generates a classifier which usually makes right predictions
and only relies on perturbation invariant features. We conduct
extensive set of experiments to evaluate the performance and
the prediction accuracy of ZK-GanDef on MNIST, Fashion-
MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets. Compared to CLP and CLS,
the results show that ZK-GanDef has the highest test accuracy
in classifying different white-box adversarial examples with
significant superiority.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We design a GAN based zero knowledge adversarial
training defense, ZK-GanDef, which utilizes feature se-
lection to enhance test accuracy on adversarial examples.
• We provide a mathematical intuition for the competition
game used in ZK-GanDef that its trained classifier usually
makes right predictions based on perturbation invariant
features.
• We empirically show that ZK-GanDef significantly en-
hances the test accuracy on adversarial examples over
state-of-the-art zero knowledge adversarial training de-
fenses.
• Existing work only tests CLP and CLS on small datasets
like MNIST. In this work, we empirically show that CLP
and CLS do not scale well to complex datasets such
as CIFAR10. In contrast, we show that ZK-GanDef can
defend adversarial examples in such complex datasets.
• We empirically show that ZK-GanDef can achieve com-
parable test accuracy to the state-of-the-art full knowledge
defenses. At the same time, it significantly reduces the
training time compared to full knowledge defenses. For
example, its training time is 92.11% less than that of
PGD-Adv on MNIST dataset.
The rest of the work is organized as follows. Section II
presents background material. The design and mathematical
proof of ZK-GanDef are given in Section III. Section IV
presents the test-bed design and the experimental settings.
The evaluation results are shown in Section V. Section VI
concludes the paper and Section VII presents our future
direction.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this section, we introduce background material about
adversarial example generators and defensive mechanisms for
better understanding of the concepts presented in this work.
We also provide relevant references for further information
about each topic.
A. Generating Adversarial Examples
The methods for generating adversarial examples against
NN classifiers can be categorized according to several different
aspects. In one aspect, these methods could be distinguished
by the adversary’s knowledge of the target NN classifier. In
White-box methods, the adversary is assumed to have full
knowledge about the target NN classifier (structure, parameters
and inner status), and hence the generated examples are called
white-box adversarial examples. On the other hand, black-
box methods assume that the adversary has no access to the
inner information of the target NN classifier, and hence, the
generated examples are called black-box adversarial examples.
On another aspect, adversarial example generation methods
could be categorized into single-step or iterative methods
according to the process of generating the examples. Single-
step methods only run gradient descent (ascent) algorithm
once when solving the proposed optimization problem, while
iterative methods repeat the computation several times until
hitting predefined convergence thresholds.
Based on previous works, an adversarial example generator
is generally formulated as an optimization problem which
searches a small neighboring area of the original image
(usually defined by l1, l2 or l∞ norm) for the existence of
adversarial examples. If we denote an original image by x¯ and
the example with perturbation δ by xˆ = F(x¯ + δ), then the
process of searching adversarial examples can be formulated
as follows [6]:
minimize
δ
||xˆ− x¯||
subject to C(xˆ) = zo
F(x¯+ δ) ∈ Rm[−1,1]
The function C represents the classifier and outputs the pre-
softmax logits based on input image. The function F projects
the pixel value of any input image back to R[−1,1] and ensures
that the generated adversarial example is still a valid image. A
perturbation is considered strong enough to fool the classifier
if and only if C(xˆ) = zo, where zo is the objective pre-
softmax logits designed by adversary. The global optimum of
this problem corresponds to the strongest adversarial example
for a given image. However, modern classifiers are highly non-
linear, which makes it hard to solve the optimization problem
in its original form, and hence each generator has its own
approximation to make the optimization problem solvable.
Table I summarizes all the notations that we use throughout
this paper. In the following, we describe the design approaches
of several popular adversarial example generators that we
consider in this work.
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L, LCLP, LCLS loss function of NN classifier
F regulation function for pixel value of generated
example
zo objective pre-softmax logits designed by adversary
l1, l2, l∞ the 1st order, 2nd order and infinity order norm
x¯, X¯; xˆ, Xˆ; x, X original example; example with perturbation; their
union
t¯, T¯ ; tˆ, Tˆ ; t, T ground truth of x¯, X¯; xˆ, Xˆ; x, X
z¯, Z¯; zˆ, Zˆ; z, Z pre-softmax logits of x¯, X¯; xˆ, Xˆ; x, X
s¯, S¯; sˆ, Sˆ; s, S source indicator of x¯, X¯; xˆ, Xˆ; x, X
δ perturbation
C, C∗ NN based classifier
D, D∗ NN based discriminator
J, J ′ reward function of the minimax game
Ω, ΩC , ΩD weight parameter in the NN model
λ, γ trade-off hyper-parameters in CLP, CLS and Gan-
Def
TABLE I: Summary of Notations
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) is introduced by
Goodfellow et. al in [6] as a single-step white-box adversarial
example generator against NN image classifiers. This method
tries to maximize the loss function value, L, of NN classifier,
C, to find adversarial examples. The calculation of loss is
usually defined as the difference between ground truth, t, and
the softmax transformation, f(zi) = e
zi∑
zj
ezj
, of pre-softmax
logits.
maximize
δ
L(zˆ = C(xˆ), t)
subject to F(x¯+ δ) ∈ Rm[−1,1]
As a single-step generator, only one iteration of gradient ascent
is executed to find adversarial examples. It simply generates
examples with perturbation, xˆ, from original images, x¯, by
adding small perturbation, δ, which changes each pixel value
along the gradient direction of the loss function. Although
running one iteration of gradient ascent algorithm can not
guarantee finding a solution which is close enough to optimal
one, empirical results show that adversarial examples from
this generator can mislead Vanilla NN classifiers. Intuitively,
FGSM runs faster than iterative generators at the cost of
weaker adversarial examples. That is, the success rate of attack
using the generated examples is relatively low due to the linear
approximation of the loss function landscape.
Basic Iterative Method (BIM) is introduced by Kurakin
et. al in [9] as an iterative white-box adversarial example
generator against NN image classifiers. BIM utilizes the same
mathematical model as FGSM but runs the gradient ascent
algorithm iteratively. In each iteration, BIM applies small per-
turbation and maps the perturbed image through the function
F . As a result, BIM approximates the loss function landscape
by linear spline interpolation. Therefore, it generates stronger
examples and achieves higher attack success rate than FGSM
within the same neighboring area.
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) is another iterative
white-box adversarial example generator recently introduced
by Madry et. al in [14]. Similar to BIM, PGD solves the
same optimization problem iteratively with projected gradient
descent algorithm. However, PGD randomly selects initial
point within a limited area of the original image and repeats
this several times to search adversarial example. Since the
loss landscape has a surprisingly tractable structure [14], PGD
is shown experimentally to solve the optimization problem
efficiently and the generated examples are stronger than those
of BIM.
B. Adversarial Example Defensive Methods
Here, we categorize the design of defensive methods against
adversarial examples into three major classes. The first is based
on applying data augmentation and regularization during the
training. The second class aims at adding protective shell on
the target classifier, while the last class focuses on utilizing
some adversarial examples to retrain the target classifier. In
the following, we introduce representative examples from each
of the above three approaches:
Augmentation and Regularization usually utilize synthetic
data or regulate hidden states during training to enhance the
test accuracy on adversarial examples. One of the early ideas
in this direction is the defensive distillation. In the context of
adversarial example defense, distillation is done by using the
prediction score from original NN, which is usually called
the teacher, as ground truth to train a smaller NN with
different structure, usually called the student [19] [18]. It has
been shown that the calculated gradients from student model
become very small or even reach zero and hence, can not
be utilized by adversarial example generators [18]. Examples
of recent approaches under this category of defenses include
Fortified Network [10] and Manifold Mixup [26]. Fortified
Network utilizes denoising autoencoder to regularize the hid-
den states. With this regularization, trained NN classifiers learn
to mitigate the difference in hidden states between original and
adversarial examples. Manifold Mixup also focus on hidden
states but follows a different way. During training, Manifold
Mixup uses interpolations of hidden states and logits instead
of original training data to achieve regularization. However,
this set of defenses is shown to be not very reliable as they
are vulnerable to certain adversarial examples. For example,
defensive distillation is vulnerable to Carlini attack [4] and
Manifold Mixup can only defend against single step attacks.
Protective Shell is a set of defensive methods designed
to reject or reform adversarial examples. Meng et. al intro-
duced an approach called MagNet [15] which falls under this
category. MagNet has two types of functional components;
the detector and the reformer. Adversarial examples are either
rejected by the detector or reformed by the reformer to clean
up adversarial perturbations. Other recent approaches like
[12], [30] and [22] also fall under this category and they
are differentiated by the way they implement the protective
shell. In [12], authors carefully inject adaptive noise to input
images to break adversarial perturbations without significantly
degrading classification accuracy. In [30], a key based cryptog-
raphy method is utilized to differentiate adversarial examples
from original ones. In [22], a generator is utilized to generate
images that are similar to the inputs. By replacing the inputs
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with generated images, the approach shows good resistance to
adversarial examples. The main limitation of the approaches
under this category is the assumption that the shell is black-
box to adversary, which turns to be inaccurate. For example,
[2] presented different ways to break this assumption.
Adversarial Training is based on the idea that adversarial
examples can be considered as blind spots of the original
training data [29]. By retraining with samples of adversarial
examples, the classifier learns perturbation patterns from ad-
versarial examples and generalizes its prediction to account for
such perturbations. In [6], adversarial examples generated by
FGSM are used for adversarial training of a NN classifier. The
results show that the retrained classifier can correctly classify
adversarial examples of this single step attack (FGSM). Later
works in [14] and [25] enhance the adversarial training process
so that the trained models can defend not only single step
attacks but also iterative attacks like BIM and PGD. A more
recent work under this category [7] introduces two zero knowl-
edge adversarial training defenses. The defenses use Gaussian
random noise for perturbations and include a penalty term
based on pre-softmax logits, z. However, the design of penalty
term is simple and not flexible enough to handle complex
patterns in z. Our goal in this work is to design a flexible zero
knowledge defense that handles z in a more sophisticated way
to achieve higher test accuracy on adversarial examples.
III. ZK-GANDEF: GAN BASED ZERO KNOWLEDGE
ADVERSARIAL TRAINING DEFENSE
In this section, we first introduce existing zero knowledge
adversarial training defenses, then, we present the design and
the algorithmic details of ZK-GanDef.
A. Zero Knowledge Adversarial Training
Recall that full knowledge adversarial training defenses re-
train NN classifier with adversarial examples. Since adversarial
examples are created by solving an optimization problem,
its preparation consumes significant amount of computation,
especially when iterative adversarial examples are utilized.
Based on experiments in [7], generating adversarial examples
on Imagenet dataset requires a cluster of GPU servers. To
overcome this limitation, authors in [7] also introduce two
zero knowledge adversarial training defenses dubbed CLP
and CLS. Instead of retraining with adversarial examples,
these approaches retrain with examples perturbed with random
Gaussian noise. The idea here is to speedup the training
process by eliminating the computationally expensive step
of adversarial examples generation. The caveat, however, is
that since the retraining is performed with ”fake” adversarial
examples, the test accuracy against ”true” adversarial examples
degrades.
The training process of CLP is visualized in Figure 2a.
The retraining dataset consists of several pairs of randomly
sampled original examples perturbed with random Gaussian
noise. After the feed forward pass through the NN classifier,
two different pre-softmax logits are generated. The differences
between these pre-softmax logits and their corresponding
ground truths are calculated as the first part of the total loss.
The l2 norm of the difference between these two pre-softmax
logits is also calculated and used as the second part in the
total loss. Based on the total loss, the weights, Ω, of the NN
classifier are updated by gradient descent algorithm and back
propagation. The training loss of CLP can be summarized as
follows:
LCLP(C) = L(zˆ1 = C(xˆ1), tˆ1) + L(zˆ2 = C(xˆ2), tˆ2)
+ λl2(C(xˆ1)− C(xˆ2))
The training process of the other zero knowledge approach,
CLS, is shown in Figure 2b. Similar to CLP, CLS retrains with
examples perturbed with random Gaussian noise. However,
instead of using pairs of inputs, CLS uses individual inputs
to the NN classifier in the forward pass. The first term of
the total loss in CLS is still calculated by a predefined loss
function of pre-softmax logits and the corresponding ground
truths. Different from the CLP, CLS directly calculates the l2
norm of pre-softmax logits as the second term in its total loss.
Thereafter, it follows the same training process with gradient
descent algorithm and back propagation to update the weights,
Ω, in the NN classifier. The loss function of CLS is as follows:
LCLS(C) = L(zˆ = C(xˆ), tˆ) + λl2(C(xˆ))
The hypothesis behind CLP and CLS is that abnormal
large values in pre-softmax logits are signals of adversarial
examples. Therefore, they both add penalty term to the loss
function during the training in order to prevent such over
confident predictions. Although the penalty terms are different,
both defenses encourage the NN classifier to output small and
smooth pre-softmax logits.
B. Design of ZK-GanDef
As mentioned in the previous subsection, CLP and CLS try
to prevent overconfident predictions by penalizing high pre-
softmax logits. However, the penalty terms used are oversim-
plified and do not utilize other valuable information contained
in the pre-softmax logits. This results, as we see in the
evaluation section, in poor accuracy on complex datasets. On
the other hand, our ZK-GanDef is designed to better utilize
the rich information available in the pre-softmax logits. As
Figure 2c shows, Zk-Gandef comprises a classifier and a
discriminator. The input to the classifier includes both original
images and randomly perturbed examples. It has been shown
in transfer learning, [5], that the pre-softmax logits output of
the classifier relates to the extracted features from its inputs.
Therefore, we use a discriminator to identify whether the
logit output of the classifier belongs to an original image or
a perturbed example. The intuition here is that the features
extracted by a Vanilla NN classifier from perturbed examples
will contain some kind of perturbations, and hence can be
recognized by a trained discriminator.
In this work, we envision that the classifier could be seen
as a generator that generates pre-softmax logits based on
selected features from inputs. Then, the classifier and the
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(a) Clean Logit Pairing (b) Clean Logit Squeezing (c) ZK-GanDef
Fig. 2: Training Procedure of Different Zero Knowledge Defenses
discriminator engage in a minmax game, which is also known
as Generative Adversarial Net (GAN) [5]. In this minimax
game, the discriminator tries to make perfect prediction about
the source of inputs (original or perturbed). At the same time,
the classifier tries to correctly classify inputs as well as hide the
source information from the discriminator. This process trains
a classifier which makes prediction based on perturbation
invariant features from inputs, as well as a discriminator which
can identify whether the features used by the fellow classifier
contain any perturbations. Through training in this competition
game, the feature learning in the classifier is regulated by the
discriminator and it finally leads to defense against adversarial
examples.
Compared with the CLP and CLS, ZK-GanDef has a more
sophisticated way of utilizing pre-softmax logits. Instead of
encouraging the NN classifier to make small and smooth logits,
ZK-GanDef aims at differentiating the latent pattern of logits
between original images and examples with perturbations.
Therefore, the NN classifier in ZK-GanDef is encouraged to
select perturbation invariant features, which enhance its test
accuracy of adversarial examples on complex datasets. It is
worth to mention that an example with Gaussian perturbation
is not necessary to be an adversarial example. However, results
in [7] show that defenses against adversarial examples can be
built by training against examples with Gaussian perturbation.
Our method is built upon this empirical conclusion.
C. ZK-GanDef Training Algorithm
Given the training data pair 〈x, t〉, where x ∈ ∪(X¯, Xˆ),
we try to find a classification function C, which uses x
to give a proper pre-softmax logits z corresponding to t.
The goal is to train the classifier in ZK-GanDef to model
the conditional probability qC(z|x) with only perturbation
invariant features. To achieve this, we employ another NN
and call it a discriminator D. D uses the pre-softmax logits z
from C as inputs and predicts whether the input image to C
was x¯ or xˆ. This process can be performed by maximizing
the conditional probability qD(s|z), where s is a Boolean
variable indicating whether the input to C was original or
randomly perturbed image. The combined minmax problem
of the classifier and the discriminator is formulated as:
min
C
max
D
J(C,D)
where J(C,D) =
E
x∼X,t∼T
{−log[qC(z|x)]} − E
z∼Z,s∼S
{−log[qD(s|z = C(x))]}
In words, the training process of the classifier (C) tries to
minimize the log likelihood of predicting s from z, while
maximizing the log likelihood of predicting z from x. At the
same time, the goal of the discriminator (D) is to maximize
the log likelihood of predicting s from z. Recall that, similar to
CLP and CLS [7], ZK-GanDef uses inputs (x) perturbed with
random Gaussian noise as an approximation of true adversarial
examples.
The pseudocode for training of ZK-GanDef is shown in
Algorithm 1. During the sampling in lines 4 and 9, a number
(predefined by user) of examples is evenly sampled from orig-
inal images X¯ and examples with Gaussian perturbations Xˆ to
form a training batch. In lines 6 and 11, the weight parameters
in the classifier (discriminator) are frozen before updating the
weight parameters in the discriminator (classifier). Finally, in
lines 7 and 12, the weight parameters are updated through the
stochastic gradient descent algorithm. In this algorithm, we
iteratively update the classifier and the discriminator one at a
time to emulate the proposed minimax game.
Algorithm 1 Training ZK-GanDef
Input: training data X , ground truth T , classifier C, discrim-
inator D
Output: classifier C, discriminator D
1: Initialize weight parameters Ω in both classifier and dis-
criminator
2: for the global training iterations do
3: for the discriminator training iterations do
4: Sample a batch of training pair, 〈x, t〉
5: Generate a batch of boolean indicator, s, corre-
sponding to training inputs
6: Fix ΩC in classifier C
7: Update ΩD in discriminator D
8: end for
9: Sample a batch of training pair, 〈x, t〉
10: Generate a batch of boolean indicator, s, correspond-
ing to training inputs
11: Fix ΩD in discriminator D
12: Update ΩC in classifier C
13: end for
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D. Theoretical Analysis
Given that J is a combination of the log likelihood of Z|X
and S|Z, we provide a mathematical intuition here that the
solution of the minimax game is a classifier which makes
correct predictions based on perturbation invariant features.
It is worth noting that our analysis is conducted in a non-
parametric setting, which means that the classifier and the
discriminator have enough capacity to model any distribution.
Proposition 1. If there exists a solution (C∗,D∗) for the
aforementioned minmax game J such that J(C∗,D∗) =
H(Z|X) − H(S), then C∗ is an optimal classifier which
correctly classifies adversarial inputs.
Proof. For any fixed classification model C, the optimal dis-
criminator can be formulated as
D∗ = arg max
D
J(C,D)
= arg min
D
E
z∼Z,s∼S
{−log[qD(s|z = C(x))]}
In this case, the discriminator can perfectly model the condi-
tional distribution and we have qD(s|z = C(x)) = p(s|z =
C(x)) for all z and all s. Therefore, we can rewrite J with
optimal discriminator as J ′ and denote the second half of J
as a conditional entropy H(S|Z)
J ′(C) = E
x∼X,t∼T
{−log[qC(z|x)]} −H(S|Z)
For the optimal classification model, the goal is to achieve
the conditional probability qC(z|x) = p(z|x) since z can
determine t by taking softmax transformation. Therefore, the
first part of J ′(C) (the expectation) is larger than or equal
to H(Z|X). Combined with the basic property of conditional
entropy that H(S|Z) ≤ H(S), we can get the following lower
bound of J with optimal classifier and discriminator
J(C∗,D∗) ≥ H(Z|X)−H(S|Z) ≥ H(Z|X)−H(S)
This equality holds when the following two conditions are
satisfied:
• The classifier perfectly models the conditional distribu-
tion of z given x, qC(z|x) = p(z|x), which means that
C∗ is an optimal classifier.
• The S and Z are independent, H(S|Z) = H(S), which
means that perturbations do not affect pre-softmax logits.
In practice, the assumption of unlimited capacity in classifier
and discriminator may not hold and it would be hard or
even impossible to build an optimal classifier which outputs
pre-softmax logits independent from adversarial perturbations.
Therefore, we introduce a trade-off hyper-parameter γ into the
minimax function as follows:
E
x∼X,t∼T
{−log[qC(z|x)]} − γ E
z∼Z,s∼S
{−log[qD(s|z = C(x))]}
When γ = 0, ZK-GanDef is the same as traditional adversarial
training. When γ increases, the discriminator becomes more
and more sensitive to information of s contained in pre-
softmax logits, z.
Fig. 3: Evaluation Framework
Based on previous proof, ZK-GanDef achieves feature se-
lection through the design of minimax game with discrimina-
tor. By selecting perturbation invariant features, the classifier
could defend against adversarial examples since they are also
combinations of original image and adversarial perturbations.
IV. EVALUATION SETTINGS
This section presents the framework that we use to evaluate
our defensive method, ZK-GanDef, under different popular
adversarial example generators and compare it with other state-
of-the-art zero knowledge adversarial training defenses. Figure
3 depicts the main components of this framework, which
include: (1) Preprocessing module, (2) Attack module and (3)
Defense module. Different adversarial example generators and
defensive methods could be used as plug-ins to Attack and
Defense modules respectively, to form different test scenarios.
In the following subsections, we present the datasets uti-
lized, the detailed description of each module, and a summary
of the evaluation metrics used.
A. Datasets
During our evaluations, the following datasets are utilized:
• MNIST: Contains a total of 70K images and their labels.
Each one is a 28× 28 pixel, gray scale labeled image of
handwritten digit.
• Fashion-MNIST: Contains a total of 70K images and their
labels. Each one is a 28 × 28 pixel, gray scale labeled
image of different kinds of clothes.
• CIFAR10: Contains a total of 60K images and their
labels. Each one is a 32× 32 pixel, RGB labeled image
of animal or vehicle.
The images in each dataset are evenly labeled into 10 different
classes. Although Fashion-MNIST has exactly the same image
size as MNIST, images in Fashion-MNIST have far more
details than images from MNIST.
B. Preprocessing Module
Preprocessing module involves the following operations:
• Scaling: Gray scale images use one integer to represent
each of their pixels, while RGB images use three different
integers (each between 0 and 255) to represent each of
their pixels. To simplify the process of finding adversarial
examples and to be consistent with the related work,
scaling is used to map pixel representations from discrete
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integers in the range Z[0,255] into real numbers in the
range R[−1,1].
• Separation: This operation is used to split each input
dataset into two groups: training-dataset and testing-
dataset. The training dataset is used to train the supervised
machine learning models which are the different NN
classifiers in this work, while the testing dataset is used
by the attack module to generate adversarial examples
in order to evaluate the NN classifier under test. The
detailed separation plans are: (1) the 70K MNIST and
Fashion-MNIST images are randomly separated into 60K
training and 10K testing images, respectively and (2) the
60K CIFAR10 images are randomly separated into 50K
training and 10K testing images.
• Augmentation: This operation is used to generate aug-
mented examples for different zero knowledge adversarial
training methods. Based on the description in [7] and
our communication with its authors, we keep the same
augmentation which is adding a Gaussian perturbation
with mean µ = 0 and standard deviation σ = 1. The
Gaussian perturbation used in this work is not guaranteed
to be the optimal choice and we keep the detailed
comparison of different augmentation methods as future
work.
C. Attack Module
The attack module implements three popular adversarial
example generators, the FGSM [6], the BIM [9] and the
PGD [14]. As we mention in the previous section, all ad-
versarial example generators are utilized under the white-
box scenario. Moreover, each original example has its own
corresponding adversarial counterparts (FGSM, BIM, PGD).
Adversarial examples from same dataset share same maximum
l∞ perturbation limits which are 0.6 in MNIST & Fashion-
MNIST and 0.06 in CIFAR10. For the BIM, we also limit the
per step perturbation to 0.1 in MNIST & Fashion-MNIST and
0.016 in CIFAR10. Finally, for the PGD, we run generation
algorithm 40 iteration with 0.02 per step perturbation on
MNIST & Fashion-MNIST and 20 iteration with 0.016 per
step perturbation on CIFAR10. To ensure the quality of the
adversarial example generators, we choose the standard python
library, CleverHans [17], which is adopted by the community.
D. Defense Module
This module implements the Vanilla NN classifiers as well
as the different defense methods that we evaluate in this work.
For the same dataset, different defense methods share the
same structure of the classifier as that of the Vanilla. Hyper-
parameters of defenses we compare with are the exact ones
used in their original papers. Our ZK-GanDef is tuned by line
search to find a suitable hyper-parameter setting.
1) Vanilla Classifier: For each dataset, we use as a baseline
a NN classifier with no defenses, which is also referred to as
the Vanilla classifier. We select different Vanilla classifiers for
each dataset. The structure of the Vanilla classifier used in
MNIST and Fashion-MNIST dataset is LeNet [14]. For the
Layer Kernel Size Strides Padding Activation
Dense 32 - - ReLU
Dense 64 - - ReLU
Dense 32 - - ReLU
Dense 1 - - Sigmoid
TABLE II: Discriminator Structure
CIFAR10 dataset, we use the allCNN based classifier [23].
Due to space limitations, the detailed NN structure and training
settings are not listed.
2) Zero Knowledge Defenses: We implement here three
different approaches: (1) a classifier trained with CLP [7], (2)
a classifier trained with CLS [7], and (3) a classifier trained
with ZK-GanDef. As Figures 2a and 2b show, CLP and CLS
train only with randomly perturbed examples. On the other
hand, ZK-GanDef (Figure 2c) trains with both original and
randomly perturbed examples. We note also that the structure
of the discriminator in ZK-GanDef (Table II) does not change
with different datasets. Training of the discriminator utilizes
the Adam optimizer [8] with 0.001 learning rate.
3) Full Knowledge Defenses: We implement here three
of the full knowledge defenses: (1) a classifier trained with
original and FGSM examples (FGSM-Adv), (2) a classifier
trained with original and PGD examples (PGD-Adv), and (3)
a classifier trained with original and PGD examples through
GAN based training (PGD-GanDef). Among them, PGD-
Adv is the state-of-the-art full knowledge adversarial training
defense.
E. Evaluation Metrics
The overall classifier performance is captured by the test
accuracy metric, which is defined as the ratio of the total
number of tested images minus the number of failed tests to the
total number of tested images (both original and adversarial).
test accuracy ≡ total # of test examples − # of failed tests
total # of test examples
A test is considered failed when: (1) original example is
missclassifed, (2) original example is rejected, or (3) adver-
sarial example is accepted with incorrect classification. To
be more precise during evaluation, we separately compute
the test accuracy on original and adversarial examples. When
a defensive method tries to maximize classifier’s capability
to identify adversarial examples, the classifier may reject or
missclassify more original examples than the corresponding
Vanilla classifier. The trade-off between correctly classifying
original and adversarial examples is the same as the trade-off
between true positive rate and true negative rate in machine
learning.
The other important metric to evaluate defense approaches
is the training time it takes to build the model. As mentioned
earlier, a significant amount of computation is consumed to
generate the adversarial examples for full knowledge adversar-
ial training. The two main contributing factors to the training
time are: (1) the structure of the classifier (number of layers
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and parameters) and (2) the searching algorithm of adversarial
examples (e.g., single-step vs. iterative approaches). The goal
is to minimize the training time while maintaining acceptable
test accuracy.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we present comparative evaluation results of
the ZK-GanDef with other state-of-the-art zero knowledge as
well as full knowledge adversarial training defenses introduced
previously. The evaluation results are summarized in three
subsections. In the first subsection, we provide comparative
evaluation of ZK-GanDef with other zero knowledge and
full knowledge adversarial training defenses on classifying
original and different types of adversarial examples. Then, we
compare the computational consumption of ZK-GanDef with
other full knowledge adversarial training defenses in terms of
training time per epoch. In the third subsection, we analyze
the convergence issues of CLP and CLS on CIFAR10 dataset.
A. Test Accuracy on Different Examples
In this subsection, we show the test accuracy of the Vanilla
classifier and the classifiers with defenses against different
types of examples. As mentioned earlier, the experiments are
conducted on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets.
For each dataset, a total of 28 different results are calculated.
These results span all possible pairs of 7 different classifiers
(Vanilla, CLP, CLS, ZK-GanDef, FGSM-Adv, PGD-Adv and
PGD-GanDef) and 4 different kinds of examples (original,
FGSM, BIM and PGD). All the validation results are presented
in Figure 4 and detailed in Table III.
1) On Original Examples: In Figure 4, we first focus on the
results presented in the first column sub-figures. These results
represent the test accuracy on original examples from different
datasets. As a baseline, the Vanilla classifier achieves 98.92%
test accuracy on MNIST, 92.43% test accuracy on Fashion-
MNIST and 89.92% test accuracy on CIFAR10. These results
are consistent with the benchmark ones presented in [3].
We then evaluate the test accuracy of the three zero
knowledge defenses (CLP, CLS and ZK-GanDef) on different
datasets. On MNIST dataset, their test accuracy on original
examples is at the same level as that of the Vanilla classifier.
The detailed results from Table III show that the difference
in test accuracy among the defenses is within 0.5%, which
is small enough to be ignored. On Fashion-MNIST dataset,
the test accuracy of CLP and CLS is 5% higher than that of
ZK-GanDef on original examples. Moreover, the test accuracy
of all zero knowledge approaches is (6% to 11%) lower than
that of the Vanilla classifier. This small degeneration is a result
of tuning the model to enhance test accuracy on adversarial
examples. On CIFAR10 dataset, CLP and CLS have a signifi-
cantly lower test accuracy compared with the Vanilla classifier
and ZK-GanDef. This is because the classifiers with the CLP
and CLS methods do not converge at the beginning of the
training. A detailed study of this phenomenon is provided in
the following subsection.
Finally, we conduct the same evaluation with full knowl-
edge adversarial training defenses and perform comparison
with the proposed ZK-GanDef. On MNIST dataset, all full
knowledge defenses and ZK-GanDef achieve the same level
of test accuracy as that of the Vanilla classifier. On Fashion-
MNIST dataset, FGSM-Adv achieves similar test accuracy
on original examples to that of the Vanilla classifier, while
ZK-GanDef, PGD-Adv and PGD-GanDef have about 10%
to 12% degeneration from that of the Vanilla classifier. On
CIFAR10 dataset, ZK-GanDef performance is similar to that
of full knowledge defenses and their test accuracy on original
examples are 6% to 10% lower than that of the Vanilla
classifier, respectively. To enhance test accuracy on adversarial
examples, the decision boundary of the classifier becomes
complex with more curves, which causes the degeneration on
classifying original examples compared to the Vanilla classifier
[14].
2) On Single-step Adversarial Examples: We discuss here
the accuracy results on FGSM examples, which are depicted
on sub-figures on the second column of Figure 4. Intuitively,
the Vanilla classifier has poor performance on these single-
step adversarial examples, with test accuracy of 21.01% on
MNIST, 7.01% on Fashion-MNIST, and 9.97% on CIFAR10.
Compared with the Vanilla classifier, all zero knowledge
defenses achieve a significant enhancement in terms of test
accuracy on all datasets, with the exception of CLP and
CLS on CIFAR10 dataset. Among the zero knowledge ap-
proaches, ZK-GanDef achieves the highest test accuracy on
all the datasets with significant margin. On MNIST, the test
accuracy is 88.70%, 89.29%, and 98.97% with CLP, CLS,
and ZK-GanDef, respectively. On Fashion-MNIST, the test
accuracy is 44.78%, 41.14%, and 70.19% CLP, CLS, and ZK-
GanDef, respectively. On CIFAR10, ZK-GanDef is the only
zero knowledge defense that reasonably works test accuracy
around 60.91%.
In general, full knowledge approaches have better under-
standing of the adversarial examples since such examples
are part of their training datasets. Therefore, full knowl-
edge approaches should, intuitively, have better test accuracy
compared to their zero knowledge counterparts. Our results
confirm this observations. The results show that the test
accuracy of full knowledge approaches is significantly higher
than those of CLP and CLS, especially on Fashion-MNIST and
CIFAR10 datasets. On the other hand, the test accuracy of ZK-
GanDef is comparable to those of full knowledge defenses. In
fact, the test accuracy of ZK-GanDef (98.97%) is higher than
those of all the full knowledge defenses (98.79%, 97.6% and
96.85%). This is because handwritten digits in MNIST are
gray scale figures with no detailed texture, and therefore, ZK-
GanDef can train to select strongly denoised (even binarized)
features without losing information. As a result, ZK-GanDef
1On CIFAR10 dataset, CLP and CLS have convergence issues during
training and hence the classifier is making random guessing. A detailed study
of this issue is provided in a following subsection.
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Fig. 4: Test Accuracy on Different Examples (In the 1st and 2nd rows, the results on MNIST dataset are presented. In the
3rd and 4th rows, the results on Fashion-MNIST dataset are presented. In the 5th and 6th rows, the results on CIFAR10
dataset are presented. The results in odd number rows compare the proposed ZK-GanDef with Vanilla as well as existing zero
knowledge methods, CLP and CLS. The results in even number rows compare the proposed ZK-GanDef with full knowledge
defenses which include FGSM-Adv, PGD-Adv and PGD-GanDef.)
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MNIST Fashion-MNIST CIFAR10
Original FGSM BIM PGD Original FGSM BIM PGD Original FGSM BIM PGD
Vanilla 98.92% 21.01% 1.00% 0.77% 92.43% 7.01% 5.62% 4.06% 89.92% 9.97% 4.93% 4.06%
CLP 99.13% 88.70% 72.61% 59.93% 85.65% 44.78% 22.30% 16.14% 10.00%1 10.00%1 10.00%1 10.00%1
CLS 99.24% 89.29% 73.84% 60.63% 86.37% 41.14% 18.55% 14.17% 10.00%1 10.00%1 10.00%1 10.00%1
ZK-GanDef 98.95% 98.97% 98.89% 98.71% 81.95% 70.19% 64.97% 63.34% 79.33% 60.91% 46.27% 54.85%
FGSM-Adv 99.07% 98.79% 12.24% 9.73% 91.17% 90.48% 7.97% 6.81% 79.88% 41.53% 30.74% 33.86%
PGD-Adv 99.15% 97.60% 94.75% 95.60% 82.33% 76.42% 66.72% 71.80% 82.06% 56.18% 49.21% 51.51%
PGD-GanDef 99.10% 96.85% 94.28% 95.31% 84.09% 68.19% 52.35% 59.51% 84.05% 54.14% 46.64% 49.21%
TABLE III: Test Accuracy on Different Examples (The left column shows the test results on MNIST dataset. The middle column
shows the test results on Fashion-MNIST dataset. The right column shows the test results on CIFAR10 dataset.)
can achieve even higher test accuracy than full knowledge
approaches.
On Fashion-MNIST, FGSM-Adv achieves the highest
test accuracy (90.48%). The PGD-Adv, PGD-GanDef and
ZK-GanDef achieve the second tier test accuracy (76.42%,
68.19% and 70.19%). This is because FGSM-Adv utilizes
only original and FGSM examples during training, and
therefore, the trained classifier is overfitting on FGSM
examples. This behavior has been observed in [25] and
denoted as gradient masking effect. On CIFAR10, PGD-Adv,
PGD-GanDef and ZK-GanDef achieve comparable test
accuracy (56.18%, 54.14% and 60.19%, respectively), while
the test accuracy of FGSM-Adv is only at 41.53%. Due
to the input dropout in allCNN classifier, the diversity of
training data is enhanced and the overfitting of FGSM-Adv is
inhibited [25]. However, FGSM examples are generated with
the weaker single-step method, and hence the test accuracy
degenerates on the stronger iterative examples.
3) On Iterative Adversarial Examples: We analyze here
the test accuracy results on BIM and PGD examples, which
are depicted on the sub-figures of the third and the fourth
columns of Figure 4, respectively. The figure clearly shows
that the Vanilla classifier completely failed with both BIM and
PGD examples. This is because BIM and PGD are iterative
adversarial examples and hence are carefully crafted to mislead
Vanilla classifiers.
Based on the test accuracy results, using zero knowledge
defenses could still enhance the performance on these stronger
adversarial examples. However, these enhancements are lower
than those on FGSM examples. Among zero knowledge
defenses, the test accuracy of ZK-GanDef is significantly
higher than those of CLP and CLS on all iterative adversarial
examples. On MNIST, the test accuracy of ZK-GanDef with
BIM and PGD examples is 25% and 38%, respectively, higher
than those of CLP and CLS. On Fashion-MNIST, the test
accuracy of ZK-GanDef on BIM and PGD examples is 42%
and 47%, respectively, higher than those of CLP and CLS.
On CIFAR10, only ZK-GanDef could work and it achieves
46.27% and 54.85% test accuracy on BIM and PGD examples,
respectively.
As mentioned earlier, full knowledge defenses could achieve
larger enhancement in test accuracy compared to the existing
zero knowledge defenses, CLP and CLS. FGSM-Adv is the
exception as evidenced by its poor performance in defending
iterative adversarial examples due to the reasons we mentioned
in the previous sub-section. On MNIST and Fashion-MNIST,
the test accuracy of FGSM-Adv on BIM and PGD examples
has a huge decrease from over 90% to around 10%. Although
such huge decrease does not exist in the case of CIFAR10, the
test accuracy of FGSM-Adv is clearly lower than that of PGD-
Adv and PGD-GanDef. On all datasets, PGD-Adv and PGD-
GanDef have much stable test accuracy with limited decrease
of test accuracy on FGSM examples. More importantly, the
results show that the test accuracy of ZK-GanDef is close to
those of PGD-Adv and PGD-GanDef on iterative adversarial
examples from the three datasets.
We summarize our findings from the results as: (i) ZK-
GanDef is significantly better than existing zero knowledge
defenses (CLP and CLS) due to its higher test accuracy
on adversarial examples and its scalability to large datasets.
This clearly supports our vision that utilizing a more flexible
and sophisticated way to handle the pre-softmax logits (ZK-
GanDef) is better than forcing the pre-softmax logits to be
smooth at a small scale (CLP and CLS). (ii) The test accuracy
of ZK-GanDef is comparable to that of the state-of-the-art
full knowledge adversarial training defenses. This supports
our hypothesis that using perturbation invariant features in the
classifier could greatly enhance test accuracy on adversarial
examples. (iii) On contrast with full knowledge defenses, ZK-
GanDef is adaptable to new types of adversarial examples.
We see from the results that FGSM-Adv has significant
adaptability issue on MNIST and Fashion-MNIST datasets.
This issue is not observed on CIFAR10 due to the input
dropout in classifier structure [25]. For PGD-Adv, the current
evaluation does not show its adaptability issue, but it is not
guaranteed given that stronger adversarial examples could be
generated in the future [25] [22]. On the other hand, the results
show that ZK-GanDef has better adaptability to new types of
adversarial examples because its training is independent of
such examples.
B. Generalizability
In the previous evaluation, all iterative adversarial exam-
ples are generated by methods based on projected gradient
descent. In order to show the generalizability of ZK-GanDef,
we conduct the evaluation on an extra set of adversarial
examples, Deepfool [16] and Carlini & Wagner (CW) ex-
amples [4]. Unlike adversarial examples used in previous
evaluation, Deepfool and CW adversarial examples contain
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Fig. 5: Training Time and Training Loss The left sub-figure is training time on MNIST and Fashion-MNIST. The middle
sub-figure is training time on CIFAR10. The right sub-figure is the training loss of CLS under different hyper-parameters.
MNIST Fashion-MNIST CIFAR10
Deepfool CW Deepfool CW Deepfool CW
98.72% 98.46% 89.52% 66.43% 86.08% 47.22%
TABLE IV: Test Accuracy on Deepfool and CW Examples
perturbation patterns that are significantly different from Gaus-
sian perturbation. Therefore, this evaluation could reveal the
generalizability of ZK-GanDef in defending other adversarial
examples. The evaluation is conducted on all three datasets.
The Deepfool and CW adversarial examples utilize the same
hyper-parameter setting as PGD adversarial examples.
The evaluation results are summarized in Table IV. It is clear
that ZK-GanDef can classify Deepfool adversarial examples
with over 85% accuracy in all three datasets which matches
the test error presented in [16]. The reason is that Deepfool
tries to find adversarial examples with smaller perturbation
than projected gradient descent based adversarial examples
(FGSM, BIM, PGD). As a result, Deepfool examples are easier
to defend. For CW examples, ZK-GanDef achieves the same
level of test accuracy on all three datasets. To conclude, ZK-
GanDef is not limited to defend a specific type of perturbation.
Although ZK-GanDef only utilizes Gaussian noise perturba-
tion during training, its defense can be generalized to a wide
range of adversarial examples which include FGSM, BIM,
PGD, Deepfool and CW examples.
C. Training Time
We evaluate here the training time of ZK-GanDef in terms
of seconds per training epoch. MNIST and Fashion-MNIST
share the same image size and classifier structure and hence
has the same training time. Since the test accuracy of ZK-
GanDef is significantly higher than those of the existing
zero knowledge defenses, CLP and CLS, we only compare
the training time of ZK-GanDef with those of full knowl-
edge defenses (FGSM-Adv, PGD-Adv and PGD-GanDef). We
utilize a fixed number of training epochs (80 for MNIST
and 300 for CIFAR10) and results show that all defensive
methods converge at epoch 30 on MNIST and at epoch 240
on CIFAR10. Since the records of training time per epoch have
a very small deviation, we take the average value of records
in all epochs and compare different defense methods with it.
The results are recorded during the training on a workstation
with a NVIDIA GTX 1080 GPU.
The left sub-figure of Figure 5 shows that the training time
of ZK-GanDef on MNIST/Fashion-MNIST (8.75s) is close
to that of FGSM-Adv (7.83s), while it surges to 110.85s
and 132.75s in the case of PGD-Adv and PGD-GanDef,
respectively. The evaluation results on CIFAR10 dataset (the
middle sub-figure of Figure 5) follow a similar trend to that
of the results on MNIST and Fashion-MNIST datasets. ZK-
GanDef and FGSM-Adv take much less training time per
epoch (71.20s and 62.85s, respectively) compared to that
of PGD-Adv (146.91s) and that of PGD-GanDef (257.72s).
For example, on CIFAR10 dataset, the end-to-end training
time of PGD-Adv takes 14.3 hours, while training of ZK-
GanDef only takes 6.9 hours. In summary, ZK-GanDef pro-
vides test accuracy close to that of the best state-of-the art full
knowledge defesnses (PGD-Adv), while reducing the training
time by 92.11% and 51.53% on MNIST/Fashion-MNIST and
CIFAR10, respectively.
D. Convergence Issue
As presented earlier, the evaluation results of CLP and CLS
on CIFAR10 dataset show that these two zero knowledge
adversarial training defenses fail to correctly classify both
original and adversarial examples. This is mainly because
the training loss of CLP and CLS does not converge during
training. The mathematical models of CLP and CLS (section
III) follow the same design logic that aims at preventing over
confident predictions. CLP achieves its goal by adding l2
norm penalty on the difference of two randomly selected pre-
softmax logits, while CLS adds l2 norm penalty on any pre-
softmax logits. Moreover, CLP and CLS do not include orig-
inal examples in their training dataset, which means that they
miss important features that can help discriminate examples
with and without perturbations. Therefore, this design logic is
too simple and lacks flexibility compared with ZK-GanDef,
which utilizes minimax game with discriminator and trains on
examples with and without perturbations. When training on
complex datasets like CIFAR10, the simple and less flexible
design logic leads to convergence issues for CLP and CLS.
To further validate this conclusion, we record the loss of
CLS during the first 30 training epochs and depict the results
on the right sub-figure of Figure 5. The training loss is
11
recorded on four different hyper-parameter settings of CLS:
(1) normal CLS (σ = 1.0, λ = 0.4), (2) CLS with reduced
perturbations (σ = 1.0, λ = 0.01), (3) CLS with reduced
penalty (σ = 0.1, λ = 0.4), and (4) CLS with reduced
perturbation and penalty (σ = 0.1, λ = 0.01). The figure
shows that the curves of the first three settings overlap with
each other and form the horizontal curve on the top. This
clearly shows that CLS does not learn any useful features and
hence the training loss does not converge (does not decrease)
under these three settings. Under the last setting, CLS was able
to learn useful features and hence the training loss decreases
towards convergence. However, with the last setting, CLS
falls back to Vanilla classifier, which fails to defend against
adversarial examples. A similar experiment is also conducted
with CLP and the results follow the same pattern. The only
difference is that the training loss goes to “nan” on CLP under
the first three settings, which means that the classifier diverges
during training.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduce a new zero knowledge adversar-
ial training defense, ZK-GanDef, which combines adversarial
training and feature learning to better recognize and identify
adversarial examples. We evaluate the test accuracy and the
training overhead of ZK-GanDef against state-of-the-art zero
knowledge adversarial training defenses (CLP and CLS) as
well as full knowledge adversarial training defenses (FGSM-
Adv and PGD-Adv). The results show that ZK-GanDef en-
hances the test accuracy on original and adversarial examples
by up to 49.17% compared to zero knowledge defenses.
More importantly, ZK-GanDef has close test accuracy to
full knowledge defenses (test accuracy degeneration is below
8.46%), while taking much less training time (more than
51.53% on training time reduction). Additionally, in contrast
to full knowledge defenses, ZK-GanDaf can adapt to new
types of adversarial examples because its training is adversarial
example agnostic.
VII. FUTURE WORK
In the future, we want to continue our research on designing
defensive methods which provide defense against different
single-step and iterative adversarial examples while consume
less computation during the training.
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